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Abstract
Much of the research to date on educational technology has
focused on its implementation in wealthy countries. Yet
instructional technology has a special allure in the developing
world, where it holds the promise not just of improving schools but
also of hastening modernization. This article examines a national
educational technology effort in Egypt, illuminating the
contradictions between the rhetoric of reform and the reality of
school practices. The analysis points to underlying political,
cultural, and economic factors that constrain attempts to improve
Egyptian schooling with technology.

Educational technology has always been about much more than improving
learning. In the eyes of many proponents, it has been about transforming
learning -- overcoming traditional educational approaches and supplanting them
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with revolutionary new paradigms of teaching, learning, and schooling. The
flashy new machine in the classroom—whether the film projector or the
television or the computer—has represented the pinnacle of modernity in the
eyes of its supporters, whether from the government, the business sector, or
academia.
Larry Cuban (1986) has done an excellent job of chronicling America’s 100-year
love affair with gleaming new machines in the classroom, from the radio to the
computer lab. Each era has experienced the same cycle of bold promises
followed by erratic and disappointing diffusion, with the technology eventually
finding a small niche on the margins of the educational process. Where
education has changed in the process, it has been in the elite schools of the
well-to-do that were disposed to reform in the first place (Cuban, 1986; 1993b).
Now the cycle begins again, with the introduction of the computer and the
Internet. There has certainly been no shortage of bold claims about how
computers will revolutionize the classroom, transforming the teacher from the
stereotypic sage on the stage to the new and equally stereotypic guide on the
side (Knapp & Glenn, 1996; Means, 1998; Mehlinger, 1996; Sandholtz,
Ringstaff, & Dwyer, 1997; Starr, 1996). Learners will become autonomous and
goal-directed, classrooms will become centers of collaborative, critical inquiry,
and technology will have finally transformed schools to match the needs of the
information society (see, for example, Starr, 1996).
Research to date, however, makes such claims questionable. Most studies
show that the use of computers tends to amplify whatever prior approaches and
processes were already occurring in classrooms, rather than transform them
(e.g., Warschauer, 1999; 2000). For example, a recently completed four-year
national US study of “network science” – in which learners from throughout the
world collect and share scientific data over the Internet – found that the projects
tended to trivialize rather than transform learning, unless they were based on
teacher-led practices of scientific inquiry in the individual classrooms (Feldman,
Konold, & Coulter, 2000).
In fairness, it is too early to judge the lasting impact of computer and Internet
technology in the classroom. Many people believe that the computer and
Internet have a more direct relationship to fundamental changes in human
communication and cognition (see Harnad, 1991) and the overall organization
of the economy and society (see Castells, 1996; 1997; 1998) than did previous
technologies such as television or film. Thus even those who have taken a
hardheaded and realistic look at computers in the classroom, such as Becker
(2000; 1982) believe that under the right conditions it may facilitate educational
reform (Becker, 2000). Perhaps the best that can be said about this is that the
jury is still out.
Not surprisingly, the discussion to date of educational technology has taken a
US- and Euro-centric viewpoint. The penetration of information and
communication technologies (ICT) in most of the rest of the world is much
lower, whether in the office, the shop floor, or the classroom. With only a small
elite having computer access, and the majority of their citizens living on a few
dollars a day (United Nations Development Programme, 2000), the developing
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countries in South Asia, Africa, and Latin America have not yet been able to fill
their classrooms with computers and Internet connections.
However, the lack of modern technology does much to heighten its allure in the
developing world. There is much discussion of the potential of new technologies
to help countries leapfrog out of underdevelopment. Just as Germany and
Japan—with their infrastructure destroyed after World War II—used a
completely new infrastructure to catch up to or even leap ahead of other
capitalist countries in efficiency of production, many believe that the least
developed countries can now make use of information and communications
technologies to skip over stages of development (see discussion in Singh,
1999). And indeed, it is precisely those countries that have been able to make
effective use of information technologies, such as Singapore, Korea, and
Taiwan, which have most recently progressed from underdevelopment to the
ranks of the wealthier countries. For developing nations, information technology
thus holds the allure of allowing rapid entry to modernity.
A number of developing and middle-income countries in Latin America, Asia,
and Africa are now beginning to experiment with information technology in the
classroom. With the price of computers and telecommunications falling, and
schooling in many countries badly needing improvement, developing countries
have great incentive to try to integrate new technologies and new approaches
(Osin, 1998). To date, though, little research or analysis has been published on
why or how developing countries are attempting to make use of technology in
schooling, or what the results have been. The few exceptions to date have for
the most part been descriptions of model projects supported by international
donor agencies (e.g., Calderoni, 1998; Potashnik, 1996). Though these reports
have been helpful, they tend to focus on best practices rather than shedding
light on actual practices. The lack of broader and more in-depth analysis of
educational technology practices in developing countries can unfortunately lead
to a situation whereby educators in those countries uncritically mimic the
practices (or what they may falsely believe to be the practices) of wealthy
countries, without proper regard to local conditions and circumstances, thus
worsening rather than solving problems. Such counterproductive approaches
are heightened by the fears of being left behind in the information revolution
(see discussion in Agre, 1997).
To help overcome this lack of information on educational technology in the
developing world, I carried out a three-year qualitative study in Egypt. Though,
as in any such study, the findings apply in particular to the situation under
investigation, Egypt represents an excellent example of a society poised on the
edge between underdevelopment and modernity (see, for example, New and
Old: A Survey of Egypt, 1999).
The study focused on the policies and practices of integrating technology in
education in governmental K-12 schools, under the leadership of the Egyptian
Ministry of Education. The overall unit of analysis for this study is the
governmental K-12 educational sector in Egypt. Where relevant, I also consider
data from other educational units in Egypt, including K-12 private schools,
governmental and private universities, and non-governmental community
technology centers. Data sources for the study included the following:
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1. Participant observation: I engaged in participation-observation
continuously for three years, from 1998-2001, while I was involved in a
donor-funded educational project in Egypt. During this time, I participated
in efforts to plan, implement, and evaluate technology-based interventions
in Egyptian schools and inservice and pre-service teacher education
programs. My participation included attendance at meetings of Ministry of
Education bodies, international donor and implementation agencies, and
Egyptian non-governmental organizations, as well as attendance at and
participation in in-service and preservice teacher training programs. It also
included professional visits to 25 Egyptian primary, preparatory (i.e.,
middle), and secondary schools located in rural and urban areas
throughout the country and to colleges of education in 10 Egyptian
universities, and participation in meetings and training sessions among
Egyptian educators. I took notes during these visits and sessions and
afterwards typed them up in personal and professional reports. Finally, I
have participated in various electronic discussion forums of Egyptian
educators focused on use of technology in education.
2. Interviews and focus groups: I conducted approximately 100 individual
interviews with Ministry of Education (MOE) officials, business leaders,
representatives of non-governmental organizations, parents, and
students. I also organized about ten focus group meetings of six-to-ten
K-12 teachers and faculty members at colleges of education to discuss
the integration of technology in classrooms and programs. I took notes
during these interviews and focus group meetings and typed them in
personal and professional reports following the interviews and meetings.
The interviews and focus groups were organized within the context of my
work in Egypt and addressed issues related to access to technology at
educational sites, skill and knowledge level of educators, and goals and
objectives of using technology with students and in professional
development programs.
3. Analysis of documents. I have collected and analyzed a wide array of
documents and reports issued by the Egyptian government and MOE,
donor agencies, and non-governmental bodies. While the majority of
these are in print, they also include electronic documents, such as
Websites of MOE bodies and schools.
The study draws on critical approaches to research on infusion of information
and communication technologies (Warschauer, 1998). A critical theory of
technology (see Feenberg, 1991) distinguishes itself from both determinist
approaches (which view technology as of necessity having a positive or
negative impact) and instrumental approaches (which view technology as a
valueless tool which can be deployed toward any end), and critical approaches.
(Determinist approaches are alternatively referred to as substantive
approaches or autonomous approaches (see, for example, the work of Ellul,
1980). Instrumental approaches are alternatively referred to as neutralist
approaches and are often backed by technologists; see discussion in Shallis
(1984).) Both determinist and instrumental approaches are seen as
downplaying the embednesses of social, political, economic, and culture factors
in technologies, which shape (but do not determine) how technologies are
deployed. In a critical approach, technology is viewed as a site of struggle, and
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investigations of technology implementation seek to uncover underlying power
relations that shape how technology is used, similarly, for example, to how
critical literacy studies seek to uncover the underlying power relations framing
literacy practices (e.g., Street, 1984; 1993).
In reporting on the study, I will focus on three aspects: (1) the discourses of
technology-based educational reform, (2) the practices of educational
technology, and (3) the social context of education and technology which helps
explain the (mis)match between discourse and practice. First, though, I will
briefly introduce some necessary background information on Egypt.

Egypt at the Turn of the Millennium
I decided to conduct this study during my first week in Egypt, as I stood on the
banks of the Nile and took in the Cairo landscape. Across the Nile, I saw the
glimmering towers of the World Trade Center, including some of the fanciest
stores, restaurants, and offices of modern Egypt. Looking down, though, I also
saw a poor family of eight who lived in three tiny boats by the bank of the Nile.
Thin and poorly clothed, this family apparently spent their days and nights on a
couple of tiny canoes no longer than a fishing pole. Yet, as I looked down, I saw
a shiny object in the center boat, and, upon looking more closely, I realized it
was a battery-operated television. Even this impoverished family living in tiny
canoes on a highly-polluted river was grasping at modernization through media.
This contrast within contrasts was an excellent introduction to me of Egypt
today. Egypt is rushing toward modernization, while at the same time
modernization must conform itself to the centuries-old ways of life of Egyptian
society.
The use of technology in education in Egypt is situated in a broader social and
educational reform movement that dates to the early 1990s. In 1992, the
Egyptian government, backed by the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund-backed structural adjustment program, launched an ambitious structural
adjustment program (Korayem, 1997). The ongoing program seeks to transform
the previously stagnant, insular semi-socialist economy inherited from the
Nasser era into a modern, transparent, and efficient economy that can compete
in a global market (Galal, 1995; Sachs, 1996). The reform process has shown
some positive results; Egypt’s gross national product grew on an average of
5.4% annually from 1995-2000 (based on data available from the World Bank,
available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/), up from an average of
1.5% in 1990-1995 (Galal, 1995). This growth has brought Egypt from the ranks
of the least developed countries up to the lower medium-development
countries, ranking at 119 out of 174 countries according to the United Nations
Development Programme’s Human Development Index, with a gross domestic
product of $3041 per person (GDP is calculated by the UNDP according to
purchasing power parity, i.e., how many equivalent goods can actually be
purchased in a country), an average life expectancy of 66.7 years, and an infant
mortality rate of 6.9% (United Nations Development Programme, 2000).
In spite of some areas of improvement, Egypt is still troubled by high rates of
poverty, reflected by a low literacy rate and poor public health in urban and rural
areas, and the financial structures of the state are far from being fully reformed
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or stable (Institute of National Planning, 1998; New and old: A survey of Egypt,
1999). The structural adjustment program thus continues with the goal of
modernizing the economy, overcoming social exclusion and poverty, and bring
Egypt to the economic level of middle-income countries such as Malaysia and
eventually to that of newly-industrialized countries such as Korea.
In no other arena is the need for institutional reform and social inclusion greater
than in education. There is wide consensus among both educators (e.g., Jarrar
& Massialas, 1992; Tawila, Lloyd, Bensch, & Wassef, 2000) and economists
(e.g., Bartsch, 1995; Fergany, 1998) about the poor performance of Egyptian
schools, even when compared to that of other developing countries (Birdsall &
Lesley, 1999). Problems identified include large class sizes, often exceeding 45
students per class in urban schools; poorly trained teachers with low wages and
status; and a centralized, test-driven curriculum focusing on rote memorization
of unimportant material (Jarrar & Massialas, 1992; Ministry of Education, 1993;
Tawila et al., 2000). These problems are reflected in a $2 billion private-tutoring
industry that is half the size of government expenditures on public education
(see discussion in Birdsall & Lesley, 1999). In effect, teachers have a
disincentive to teach well, since they earn for more than their governmental
salary by tutoring their own students privately to make up for what they failed to
learn in school.
The expense and low quality of education have contributed to a high dropout
rate in primary school (Fergany, Farmaz, & Wissa, 1996) and a corresponding
low rate of adult literacy (53.7% overall and only 41.8% of women, United
Nations Development Programme, 2000). They also lead to a low-skill level and
employment potential among those who complete school; two studies claim that
high school graduates in Egypt who don’t go on to university have less earning
potential than people who have only partially completed primary school
(Bartsch, 1995; Fergany, 1998).
The problems of education in Egypt are systemic and stem from a wide variety
of causes, including the poor state of education following the era of British
colonial influence, the rapid population growth rate which overwhelms limited
resources, and the priorities of the previous Nasserist system which
emphasized the quantity of schools rather than their quality (Jarrar & Massialas,
1992). Also of note is the limited demand for education, at least in the past, due
to the poor-performing Nasserist economy (Birdsall & Lesley, 1999). With
economic reform and growth major governmental priorities, there is now
widespread recognition in Egypt that poor-performing schools are a drag on
socio-economic development and that educational change is critical.
ICT in Egypt
The other major contextual factor shaping technology use in education is the
general growth and role of information and communication technologies (ICT) in
Egypt today. Egypt began emphasizing the adaptation and integration of ICT in
the early 1990s. Expansion of ICT is viewed as critical for modernizing
production, distribution, and marketing efforts and thus assisting Egypt in
competing successfully in the global market (Mintz, 1999). Egyptian government
and business leaders also hope that the information technology sector will
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become an important industry in its own regard, and they often point to India
and Israel as models that they would hope to emulate. Egypt has thus placed
major emphasis on ICT, and Egypt is reputed to be one of the fastest growing
ICT markets in the world. New communications media in Egypt include the
Internet, mobile telephony, and digital satellite television.
The Internet. The Internet was first introduced to Egypt in 1993, when a small
university network was established (Information technology in Egypt, 1998).
Commercial Internet use began three years later and has developed with more
government support and less censorship than in many other Mideast countries,
reaching a total of some 600,000 Internet users by 2001 (NUA, 2003),
representing about 1% of the population. The growth of the Internet in Egypt is
constrained by economic factors in a country where per capita income is
roughly $120 per month (World Bank, 2001). This is compounded by the fact
that local telephone calls cost $1-$3 an hour, making frequent Internet use
expensive even for the small middle class. Low teledensity rates – 6% nationally
(United Nations Development Programme, 2000) and only 2% in rural areas
(Badawi, 2000, July)-- mean that people do not have telephones to log on, and
only about 1% of the population own computers (United Nations Development
Programme, 2000). The Internet is thus inaccessible to Egypt’s poor, and even
many in the small middle class must resort to coping mechanisms, such as
sharing Internet accounts or using Internet cafés.
Economics is not the only factor restricting access to the Internet. Other major
factors are the high illiteracy rate and language usage. The Internet largely
arose in Egypt in English-language milieu, including the country’s small
high-tech and international and foreign business sectors, and to this day
common standards of Arabic language computing and communications have
not been reached. That means that the vast majority of Web sites and
computer-mediated communication is conducted in English (Warschauer,
Refaat, & Zohry, 2000). This presents less of a problem for the Egyptian elite,
many of who have studied in English medium schools and can thus read and
write the language as well as Arabic. However, English is taught very poorly in
public schools, so the vast majority of the people do not know it at all.
Wireless telephony. Egypt has also tried to extend its new media through
wireless telephony. The number of lines grew to more than 1 million in four
years (El-Nawawy, 2000), thus swamping Internet growth. The higher rate of
wireless telephone use compared to Internet use is due to a variety of reasons,
including language (telephone communication is done in Arabic), initial
investment (a wireless phone is much less expensive than a computer), and the
familiarity of phone use. Wireless telephony penetration has reportedly tripled
again from 2000 to 2002 to reach three million lines (Arab Communication
Consult, 2002), or about five percent of the population.
Satellite television. Finally, the government has invested heavily in the
development and launching of two digital television satellites, Nilesat 101 and
Nilesat 102, with some 180 stations, as another medium of high-tech
communications. Nilesat is designed to serve developmental goals through its
emphasis on educational program (see discussion below). Nevertheless, with
reception requiring not only a television and satellite, but also a $400 digital
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receiver, Nilesat is believed to have very few subscribers to date (Sakr, 1999).
In summary, then though new information and communications media have
grown rapidly, they remain accessible only to a few percent of the Egyptian
population. The urban and rural poor in most need of access to information and
communication resources are excluded from the new media.
It is not surprising that in Egypt, as elsewhere, information and communication
technologies are being used principally by those with money. This reflects the
natural amplifying affect of the ICT throughout the world: those with financial,
human, and social capital have better access to ICT, which they can use to
further enhance their financial, human, and social capital. And indeed, no
matter how well motivated the Egyptian government or private sector were,
there is no way they could instantaneously put computer, Internet connections,
mobile telephones, and satellite televisions in the homes of Egyptians poor.
Nevertheless, at an institutional level, governments can deploy ICT to serve
broader developmental goals. In Egypt, the main sector in which Egypt has
attempted to deploy ICT for broader development purposes is education. The
discourses of technology-based educational reform, and their practices, will now
be discussed.

Discourses of Technology-Based Reform
The Government of Egypt believes that it has found a perfect combination in
technology and educational reform. It has an ambitious and expensive plan to
use ICT to help overcome the country’s educational problems while
simultaneously preparing a technologically-skilled workforce to meet the
demands of the 21st century.
The Ministry of Education (MOE) initiated its national plan for the technological
development of education in 1994. A special unit within the MOE, called the
Technology Development Center (TDC) was formed shortly thereafter to
coordinate the MOE’s effort to infuse technology into schools.
The goals of the national technology in education plan have been laid out in a
number of publications issued by in the name of the TDC (e.g., Technology
Development Center, 1997), the MOE (e.g., Ministry of Education, 1999), and
the Minister of Education, Dr. Hussein Kamel Bahaa El Din (e.g., Bahaa El Din,
1997). These publications adopt the rhetoric of globalization, modernization,
and reform, with a focus on three areas. First, there is the discourse of
technology-based economic competition: As noted by the TDC (1997),
The whole world is undergoing an overwhelming technological
revolution in information, electronics, computers, and
communication. This revolution will widen the gap between the
developed and underdeveloped countries. Those who master
science and technology and manage information will survive, those
who do not will perish, at least economically. Egypt must race
against time so that it can jump on the wagon of the elite of the
developed world before it is to late (p. 79).
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The TDC goes on to explain that only through the infusion of modern
technology in schools can this economic challenge be met.
Following on the heels of economic competition is the discourse of educational
transformation. As Bahaa El Din (1997) writes,
This emphasis [on technology] will have a transformative effect on
education.…The information explosion has changed education from
a mode of memorization of a certain amount of knowledge to one in
which students are expected to research and apply the knowledge
they acquire to various life situations. Education will change from
one that focuses on memorization to one that focuses on research,
analysis, identification of relationships in the data, and potential
application.
A sub-component of the discourse of educational transformation is that of
autonomous learning. In MOE publications, multimedia laboratories, compact
discs, the Internet, videoconference fiber optic networks, virtual reality, and
electronic libraries will all provide learning resources so that students can
engage in learner-centered experimentation, experiential learning, and critical
thinking (Bahaa El Din, 1997; Technology Development Center, 1997).
Finally, the technology plans also emphasize equal opportunity for all. Distance
education efforts, backed by the deployment of mobile technology caravans, are
intended to bring educational resources to underserved students and thus
bolster basic education and literacy (Technology Development Center, 1997).
The Government of Egypt (GOE) and MOE have assembled an impressive
array of resources toward meeting these goals, including more than 600
full-time staff working for the TDC. The major technology projects involve
computers and the Internet, satellite television, and video conferencing.
Computers and Internet: The TDC has placed multimedia rooms in all
secondary and preparatory (i.e., middle) schools in Egypt and many primary
schools. These rooms have 2-3 high-end computers, LCD devices for projecting
from a computer to a screen, collections of educational software, and access to
the Internet. These rooms are to be resources areas for teachers who can bring
in their classes on a sign-up basis. Much of the school curriculum has been
transferred to CD format for use in these multimedia rooms.
In addition to the multimedia rooms, secondary schools also have computer
laboratories with 10-15 DOS or Windows computers. These courses are used
for teaching an elective subject course called “computing” which is designed to
cover basic operation and programming skills.
Satellite Television: Ten of the Nilesat television stations have been dedicated
to educational program. Ministry of Education staff are creating educational
television programs for seven of these stations based on the national
curriculum. (The other three stations have been dedicated to the Ministry of
Higher Education). Televisions, satellites, and digital receivers have been
installed in the above-mentioned multimedia rooms in approximately ten
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thousand schools to facilitate access to the programming.
Videoconferencing Facilities: A national multipoint videoconference facility
has been established, with videoconference training centers of 100-200 seats in
each of Egypt’s 27 governorates. The facilities are principally used for national
teacher training programs and for national communications between Ministry of
Education staff. The facilities allow participants in these programs to project
from any site to all the other sites.

Practices of Educational Technology
The funds spent on information and communication technology represent a
major investment for a developing country. What then are the results of this
investment, and how do they match the MOE’s lofty goals for technology in
education? Unfortunately, results to date are unsatisfactory in all areas.
Technology has been thrust on top of a mostly dysfunctional system, rather
than used to help transform that system. The Technology Development Center
itself is an add-on to the Ministry of Education that grabs up a huge portion of
Ministry resources but appears to coordinate poorly with other sections of the
Ministry, such as the departments of secondary or basic education or the
department for inservice training. Serious problems have emerged in each of
the three program areas:
Computers and Internet
The computers in the multimedia rooms, with 2-3 computers per school, seem
to be spread too thin to make any difference. In any case, the rooms are often
locked up, as local school authorities don’t want to suffer the risk of having
expensive equipment damaged. Classroom visitors representing donor
agencies usually are given a special showcase presentation in a computer
room. But, during those same visits, when I inspected the use logs, it was clear
that many of the multimedia rooms in the schools I visited are rarely used
outside of these formal visits. This phenomenon has frequently been reported
often in the press. As one article (PCs and teachers omitted from new computer
science curriculum, 2000) exclaimed,
Primary School teacher Hasnaa el-Hefnawi is enraged by the
decision to introduce the computer science curriculum…The ministry
has repeatedly tooted its own horn about how many computers it
has supplied to schools. “Doesn’t the minister realize that these
computers are kept in school warehouses like antiques or used
merely for decoration” she mused (p. 2).
This sentiment was echoed by a teacher on an e-mail list of Egyptian educators,
who complained about the technology gatekeepers at his own school, “And the
good people know only how to unplug and cover it to protect the computer from
dust so as not to be damaged.”
During my visits to schools, when students did use these multimedia rooms,
they usually sat and watched the teacher lecturing, as usual, but this time with
the aid of a CD for presentation. The CDs themselves contain the exact same
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material as the textbooks, transferred to a new medium, with little attention
given to principles of interactivity or participatory learning. Teachers who
attempt to use the computers in more creative ways, even by making their own
Microsoft Word or Microsoft PowerPoint files, have told me that they were
warned that any activity other than using the Ministry-provided software is
prohibited so as to protect against viruses.
Meanwhile, the laboratories of 10-15 computers are used for a course in basic
computer literacy, which focuses for the most part on mastering DOS (or, in
some cases, Windows) commands. Teachers of that class, as of other classes,
told me that they are not allowed to depart from the prepared curriculum, nor
are they prepared to do so based on knowledge, background, or training. The
laboratories themselves, which could potentially offer a site for creative
hands-on use by students in other subjects or after school, are generally
forbidden to be used for anything other than the specified computer literacy
courses, at least in the schools that I visited.
Finally, Internet access is routed by telephone via MOE Offices to ensure better
control. This necessitates a double-connection process that rarely functions. In
any case, in the schools that I visited, only the official in charge of the
multimedia room was given the Internet account information, and neither
classroom teachers nor students were allowed to access the Internet
independently.
Satellite Television
The MOE rushed to transfer its entire curriculum to satellite television
programming, similar to how it transferred the curriculum to CD format. In Egypt,
the textbook is the curriculum, so this has too often meant simply converting an
unappealing textbook into a similarly unappealing television program.
Scriptwriters with more creative ideas have had their efforts rejected by the
directors who are under pressure to develop an enormous amount of television
material in a short amount of time. In any case, educational programming on
satellite television appears to be rarely viewed, since relatively few people have
bought a digital receiver at home and there is little reason to interrupt a class to
bring students into a crowded television room to watch the same material that is
found in their book.
Interactive Videoconferencing
The videoconference centers are used for teacher training, but the trainings that
I have observed and heard about were more often based on lengthy talking
head lectures from Cairo rather than real interaction. Scheduled
videoconference trainings are frequently interrupted when the system breaks
down or when top Ministry officials take over the system to communicate with
subordinates around the country or to showcase the facilities to international
visitors.
The ineffective use of videoconferencing parallels a broader problem with
teacher training in new technology. Such training is generally reserved for the
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school computer specialists, and is generally limited to computer operations.
The computer specialists have had no training in assisting teachers to make
use of computers in teaching. Teachers themselves know little about either the
pedagogy of instructional technology or even basic computer operations. As
one university lecturer explained to me, “we have the hardware, we have the
software, but we lack the humanware.”
The problems with educational technology in Egypt are widely known and are
reported frequently in the press (e.g., PCs and teachers omitted from new
computer science curriculum, 2000). The ill-suited expenditures on
technology—with the emphasis on hardware and software and inattention to
promoting effective use of technology by skilled practitioners--serve to deepen
public cynicism for the government and the Ministry of Education.
Educational Reform?
How then do these efforts stack up against Egypt’s developmental goals of
modernization, educational reform, and social inclusion? Though modernization
and reform are the raison d’être of using technology in schools, the funds spent
on technology have not served that purpose. Basic steps, such as using e-mail
networks to facilitate coordination among teachers, have been ignored, in favor
of high-profile but ill-suited expenditures. The Ministry rushes from one
high-tech scheme to another, in recent years, rushing to transfer content to
CD-ROMs, digital satellite television programs, and streaming video. In all
cases, the content remains more or less the same, and the instruction is
top-down, without engaging the type of interaction and inquiry among teachers
and learners that the Ministry itself says is necessary for educational
improvement (see, for example, Bahaa El Din 1997). The same top-down
hierarchy permeates the TDC as other sections of the Ministry, giving classroom
teachers—let alone students—little opportunity to exercise independent
initiative.
In short, the curriculum, the exams, the teaching methods, and the need for
expensive private tutoring have all remained the same. On a few occasions, ICT
provides an alternate delivery mechanism, but the methods and content and
approach to education have not substantially changed. ICT has not appeared to
contribute in any meaningful way to reform and modernization of education.
There is also concern that ICT expenditures could be deepening social
inequality. A major hindrance to Egypt’s development is its unequal education
system, and the resulting poor human capital development among the urban
and rural poor, especially rural girls. The high rate of illiteracy in Egypt,
especially among girls, is a major brake on development. Economists and
development specialists believe that Egypt’s educational expenditures are
skewed to the well-off, and that Egypt spends an insufficient amount of its
overall education pie on basic education and literacy promotion (Birdsall &
Lesley, 1999; Institute of National Planning, 1998)
Not surprisingly, the investments in ICT have done little to overcome this bias
and have likely worsened it. Egypt’s investment in ICT, as in other countries,
goes to those sectors best able to absorb it. When Egypt needs to be investing
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more in rural, primary education, ITC spending is skewed toward universities
and secondary schools, which are located disproportionately in urban areas.
With a mean years of schooling rate of 5.0 years (Fergany, 1998), much of the
population never reaches the secondary schools that are absorbing the
technological resources. A new effort to provide computers to university
students at below-market prices is laudable on paper but will also put computing
resources in the hands of those who can most afford them on their own. The
expensive videoconferencing centers are based in governmental capital cities
and draw money away from other types of school-based teacher training
programs that could be spread more equitably around the country. In sum, the
vast majority of spending on ICT is apparently going toward secondary and
higher urban education, rather than toward improved primary rural education
that could help combat illiteracy in Egypt.
In addition, an emphasis on ICT in education has tended to privilege the use of
English over Arabic. Whereas textbooks available in Egyptian schools are all
available in Arabic, much computing in Egypt takes place in English – due to
English language computer science terms, English operating systems, English
resources on the Internet, etc. (Warschauer et al., 2002). An increased
emphasis on English—including the introduction of English in primary
schools—has thus far borne little fruit (due to a lack of trained teachers,
overcrowded classrooms, etc.), but has disadvantaged those students in rural
primary schools who now have less time and opportunity to work toward gaining
literacy in Arabic.

The Social Context of Educational Reform and Technology
It is not surprising that Egypt’s educational technology effort has fallen short of
its goals. Countries such as the United States, that have been spending a great
deal more money on educational computing for a much longer period of time,
are still far from getting it right. The learning curve for intelligent use of
technology is a long and steep one, and there is no reason to expect Egypt to
outperform other countries in this regard.
However, it is worth analyzing the Egyptian case in more detail to interpret the
social context of educational technology difficulties. This may shed light on the
broader issue mentioned at the beginning of this article as to whether the
infusion of technology constitutes a lever for reform.
I believe the evidence of this study strongly supports the socialization view
articulated by Cuban (1986; 1993a; 1993b) and others (e.g., Spindler, 1974)
that gives priority emphasis to the broader social shaping role of schools.
According to this view, deeply-held cultural beliefs about the nature of
knowledge, how teaching should occur, and how children should learn steer
policymakers and teachers toward certain forms of instruction, and that these
forms of instruction are guided by the broader role of the schools to "inculcate
into children the prevailing social norms, values, and behaviors that will prepare
them for economic, social, and political participation in the larger culture"
(Cuban 1993, p. 249). From this perspective, educational reform is not
impossible, but tends to be available most often to the more privileged strata of
society. Reforms affecting the masses are usually carried out in fringe ways,
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without disrupting the overall socialization function of the schools.
In this regard, it is useful to explore the broader social context that frames
education in Egypt, and see how this framework constrains educational reform
with computers. Three aspects will be examined: the political, the cultural, and
the economic.
The Politics of School Reform
The political context of Egypt reflects a strong carry-over from the Nasser
period, based on authoritarian rule by a military-backed leadership within a
patriotic, nationalist framework (Hinnebusch, 1990). Egyptians enjoy neither
freedom of speech, nor freedom of organization, nor freedom of organization
and protest. Strikes and demonstrations are disallowed, those expressing
contrary political or religious views are jailed, and formation of political parties
and non-governmental organizations is restricted (The Economist Intelligence
Unit, 1998-99). The current president, Hosni Mubarak, has been in power since
1981, and the country has been under Emergency Law during the entire time of
his rule.
What then is the political role of schooling in Egypt, dating back to the Nasser
regime? It is largely to forge a national identity based on mass access to
(formally) equal schooling (see Jarrar & Massialas, 1992 for a history of Egypt’s
educational policies). Nasser brought huge numbers of children into the
Egyptian school system, and construction of new schools continues to be a
major priority of the current government (and deservedly so). However, dating
back to the days of Nasser, any reform which allowed differences to emerge in
schools, or which lessened the authoritarian hierarchy of the educational
system, was highly suspect.
Today’s political leaders, like Nasser, see schooling largely from the view of
social control. Though the Islamist fundamentalist movement in Egypt is under
greater control than it was in the 1990s, Islamist opposition remains a threat to
the government, just as it has for the last 50 years (and, indeed, may grow due
to public frustration with regional political events). In such a climate, a main
function of schooling in Egypt, in the eyes of the regime, is to foster
pro-government sentiment and to isolate the Egyptian fundamentalists. Toward
this end, the appearance of modernization has proven very attractive. By
constantly emphasizing how many computers it has put in schools and how
advanced its videoconference system is, the government goes on the offensive
to show that it represents the future and that it can compete with the wealthiest
countries in the world. However, to actually use this equipment to reshape
schooling would pose too much of a threat to a fundamentally conservative
institution. So the system – beyond the wishes and desires of any particular
individual – supports a rhetoric of reform without its substance. This is not due
to the conspiracy of an elite, but rather due to the institutional reproduction of an
educational and social system similar to that which occurs throughout the world.

The Culture of School Reform
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For a variety of historical, political, social, economic, and religious reasons, a
culture of vertical hierarchy permeates Egypt and the Arab world. Information is
meant to be horded, decisions are made at the top, and rulers maintain power
through a complex balance of power techniques. This hierarchical system,
which de Atkine (2000) found to be evident in the Egyptian military, also
pervades other social systems in the country (see discussion in Hudson, 2000).
And indeed, an almost militaristic like atmosphere pervades the Ministry of
Education, especially as it affects the use of technology. All three top leaders of
the Technology Development Center are former military generals (none, by the
way, with a background in education), and former corporals, lieutenants, and
other officers are found below them. Computers are found on none of their
desks, except as monitoring devices, i.e., to observe educational
videoconferencing sessions organized within the Ministry. The TDC, like other
governmental and MOE departments, is hierarchical to the extreme, with long
chains of command, and those at any level but the top unable to make
decisions. For example, on one occasion, I made a simple request of a teacher
to see a copy of the CD that he uses in school. The request was bounced up
one level after the other, with no one lower than the Vice-Minister of education
willing to grant permission. (The Vice-Minister finally said yes.)
In such an atmosphere, it is not surprising that technology serves a purpose of
hierarchy and transmission, rather than of horizontal networking (see discussion
of this same issue in US education in Hodas, 1993). Though the MOE and TDC
adopt the discourse of interactive education, the spending and support –
whether on satellite television, or CDs, or top-down training via
videoconferencing – has gone almost entirely to transmission technologies.

The Economics of School Reform
Egypt, like many developing countries, is highly stratified, yet that stratification is
expressed in a special way. Due to the land reforms and other programs of the
Nasser regime, income inequality and land inequality are relatively low.
Education inequality, however, is quite high, even when compared to other
developing countries. Data gathered by Birdsall and O’Connell (1999) illustrates
this point (see table 1).
Table 1. Sources of Inequality Across Countries (Gini coefficients c. 1990)
Country

Income
Inequality

Education
Inequality

Land
Inequality

Egypt

.320

.700

.480

Kenya

.544

.600

.746

Jordan

.407

.615

.686

Brazil

.596

.461

.852

15 of 23

Indonesia

.317

.494

.556

Korea

.336

.257

.351

Thailand

.515

.456

.366

Source: Birdsall and O’Connel, 1999

In other words, control of education—much more so than in other countries—is
a principle means by which the well-to-do in Egypt defend their privileged social
status. And the social status achieved through education means a great deal in
Egypt. It allows people to join the highest paying and most prestigious
professions, it is a de facto requirement for setting up your own business, and it
is a prerequisite for marriage within the elite and thus enjoying the financial and
social benefits showered on family members by the Egyptian upper class.
The defense of social status through elite education takes place through several
means. First, a disproportionate share of funding goes to university education
as opposed to K-12 education (Birdsall & Lesley, 1999; Fergany, 1998; Institute
of National Planning, 1998). Secondly, socioeconomic privilege is reserved for
those who complete the university; as mentioned earlier, those who graduate
secondary school without a university education are actually worse off
economically than primary school drop-outs unless they choose to work outside
Egypt (Bartsch, 1995). Third, access to universities – and to the most elite
departments or programs within the universities – is based on a set of
decontextualized school-leaving exams that the wealthy have been preparing
for all their lives, through their better private schools and their expensive private
tutoring.
This class bias that permeates Egypt’s educational system makes school
reform extremely difficult to achieve. The Ministry of Education has attempted to
disrupt the testing and private tutoring system for years, but has been
continually rebuffed by a powerful elite who have invested huge sums in
preparing their children to pass the exams and gain access to the elite (see
Sarhaddi Nelson, 2001) and who thus have little interest in seeing such a
system overturned.
This economic elite who exercise a powerful influence over Egyptian politics
have little interest in technology-based school reform in governmental schools.
Their children are already becoming computer-proficient at home, and for them
the schools serve as little more than a sorting system to maintain their class
privilege.
Meanwhile the poor have little vested interest in demanding computers in the
schools. The struggle of the poor is for decent basic education that will allow
their children to read and write and compete fairly in society. With class sizes of
upwards of 60 in the poor neighborhoods of Cairo, and many urban and rural
schools lacking basic amenities, the poor have other priorities than computers
and the Internet in schools, which are widely viewed as a boondoggle. There is
thus no constituency that is fighting hard to reform schools through infusions of
technology.
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In summary then, there are powerful political, cultural, and economic factors
motivating the current structure of education in Egypt. Large-scale spending on
information technology has had little if any impact on changing these factors,
and it is unrealistic to expect that it will. The emphasis on the façade of reform
without any substantial changes is evident throughout the educational system.
The Ministry began teaching English in elementary school in order to emphasize
modernization and ties to the West, but this instruction has almost no value
because the majority of those designated to teach English in primary school
know little of the language itself. (Indeed, a committee of Egyptian applied
linguistics, several with expertise in the field of English language teaching,
recommended against the change to earlier English language education.) The
Ministry, at huge expense and often with the support of donor funding, also
sends thousands of teachers per year to the United States and Britain to
expose them to Western environments and approaches, but makes it difficult
for these same teachers to implement any substantial changes when they
return (Warschauer, 2003b). In other words, whether in English teaching,
teacher training, or use of technology, a higher priority is put on creating the
illusion of modernization rather than on actually modernizing practices.
Finally, though beyond the scope of this particular work, the role of donor
agencies must also be briefly mentioned. For example, the United States
Agency for International Development has long made Egypt one of its largest
recipients, principally for global political reasons (Weinbaum, 1986). In too many
cases, the US and other donors have poured money into expensive
infrastructure projects in Egypt, including those related to technology in
education, without paying sufficient attention to how technology might actually
be best used in local contexts (see discussion in Warschauer, 2003a, 2003b).

Conclusion
While the large gap between rhetoric and reality of technology-based
educational reform in Egypt stems in part from poor planning, it is also the
logical outcome of powerful socioeconomic factors that shape educational
policy and practice in Egypt. Though Egyptian officials voice the discourses of
reform popularized in the West, it is unlikely that they will be widely practiced in
Egypt (and, indeed, it is questionable how often they are actually practiced in
Western countries.) Egypt would do better to draw on its own social norms in
designing educational reform policies. Holliday (1992; 1994) has demonstrated
that the best classroom instruction in Egypt is teacher-centered, reflecting the
social and cultural realities of Egypt rather than the learner-centered
environment favored in US graduate schools of education; most Egyptians
believe that their educators should organize “teaching spectacles” featuring
top-down instruction rather than “learning festivals” based on collaborative
project-work (Holliday, 1994, p. 36). If and when educational technology begins
to make positive headway in Egypt, it will be in a way that is likely very different
than a Western-based discourse might suggest. Indeed, the US has its own
share of educational problems, and many countries with traditions of
teacher-centered education, such as Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, have
shown great success in raising the educational level of their students.
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As for the more general conclusion, this study provides support for the work of
Cuban and others who emphasize the limited impact of machines in reforming
education. In Egypt, as in the US, technology can play a role in remaking
education only if an when broader social, political, cultural, and economic
factors are aligned to make school reform likely. This does not suggest a
fatalistic approach that denies human agency, but it does imply that technology
is something other than a neutral tool that can be deployed toward any ends. It
is better to think of information and communication technologies as
“socio-technical networks” (Kling, 2000, p. 3) that involve complex social
relationships and contexts.
In other words, those who seek to reshape schools, whether in Egypt, the US,
or elsewhere, need to think about not only the technology of the classroom, but
also the technology of informational capitalism. Globalization, post-Fordism
industrial relations, and the advent of new communications media are changing
the context of education in the US, other Western countries, and, increasingly,
in the developing world. These broader economic shifts may well introduce a
greater demand for a more educated (or differently-educated) workforce in
Egypt, and there are already signs that the business community in Egypt is
starting to throw its weight toward educational reform for just this reason.
Modernization of the educational system in Egypt, as elsewhere, will come
about because influential social forces push for it, not because x number of
computers have been put in y number of schools. Changes in the political
economy can result in a context that better supports reform, but even then
reform will not happen on its own. Working for educational reform requires not
machines but rather mobilization—that is, the engagement of social actors to
press for change, taking into account the relevant political, economic, and
cultural contexts that help shape classroom learning and teaching.
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